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I

n Vanessa Redgrave v. Boston Symphony Orchestra, Inc., 399 Mass. 93
(1987), the Supreme Judicial Court (SJC)
issued an important ruling on the
parameters of the Commonwealth's
relatively new Civil Rights Act
(MCRA)' by answering two questions
certified to it by the United States Court
of Appeals for the First Circuit. The SJC
held that MCRA is essentially the state
equivalent of 42 U.S.C. §1983 without
the federal "state action" requirement.'
This article briefly examines the SJC's
decision in Redgrave in light of Massachusetts precedent and the vast federal
experience with §1983 actions (Section
I) and then considers the implications of
the Court's refusal to permit the BSO to
raise acquiescence to pressure from third
parties as a defense to MCRA liability
(Section II).
The questions certified to the SJC involved an appeal by Miss Vanessa Redgrave from the denial by the United
States District Court of her post-trial
motion for judgment notwithstanding
the jury's verdict. The jury found that

the Boston Symphony Orchestra (BSO)
was not liable under MCRA for violating Miss Redgrave's civil rights by canceling a performance after the BSO
received threats of disruption prompted
by community disagreement with Miss
Redgrave's outspoken support for the
Palestine Liberation Organization. 3 Noting that Miss Redgrave's appeal involved an important issue of state law,
the First Circuit requested that the SJC
determine whether:
1. "Under the Massachusetts Civil
Rights Act, Mass. Gen. Laws Ann.
Ch. 12, §11 H and §11 I, may a
defendant be held liable for interfering with the rights of another person, by 'threats, intimidation, or
coercion', if the defendant had no
personal desire to interfere with the
rights of that person but acquiesced
to pressure from third parties who
did wish to interfere with such
rights?"; and
2. "Ifa defendant can be held liable
under the Massachusetts Civil
Rights Act for acquiescence to third
party pressure, is it a defense for the
defendant to show that its actions
were independently motivated by
additional concerns, such as the
threat of extensive economic loss,
physical safety, or particular concerns affecting the defendant's
course of business?"
The SJC answered "yes" to the first certified question and "no" to the second.
I. The Legal Precedents
In Redgrave, the SJC noted that the
remedy and scope of relief available
under §11 1 "is coextensive with the
remedy provided under Federal law by
means of 42 U.S.C. §1983 (1982), except
that the state statute does not condition
the availability of the remedy on State
action." 3 This determination immediately foreclosed any discussion with
respect to the actual intent of the BSO
to deprive Redgrave of her constitutional rights, as the federal courts have
6
long been guided by Monroe v. Pape,
which holds that §1983 imposes no
burden on a plaintiff to prove that a
§1983 defendant had a specific intent to
violate his or her civil rights. Thus, it
was irrelevant to the Court's analysis

that the BSO may not have intended
any interference with Miss Redgrave's
rights.7
The absence of an intent requirement
is significant. As the dissenting SJC
justices noted, the result is the constitutionalization of torts committed by private parties. However, what was dispositive in the majority's view was the
potential effect of holding otherwise;
namely, that third party coercion could
be raised as a defense to an MCRA violation. Specifically, the Court noted that
Making an exemption for civil
rights deprivations resulting from
third-party pressure "would reward
and encourage" the very conduct
which the substantive statutes prohibit . . . recognizing such an exemption would tend to eviscerate
the statute and defeat the legislative
policies behind the statute.8
In spite of the fact that the Court acknowledged that the federal common
law of §1983 governs decisions under
MCRA §11 I, the SJC's opinion does not
include a meaningful attempt to consider the issue of a third party coercion
in the federal context. This omission is
curious, as it is these federal cases,
together with an important Massachusetts decision, which provide a coherent
framework in which best to understand
Redgrave.
A. The Massachusetts Precedvnt
The SJC makes reference to one important Massachusetts decision in support
of its answer in Redgrave to the first of
the certified questions. In Sarni Original
Dry Cleaners, Inc. v. Cooke,' the SJC
ruled that an employer could not lawfully terminate a black driver in anticipation of angry reactions from whites
on the driver's South Boston delivery
route. 10
The employer in Sarni had replaced
the black driver with a white driver
shortly after a small group of people in
South Boston threw rocks at the black
driver and his truck. The employee then
riled charges with the Massachusetts
Commission Against Discrimination
(MCAD) and the employer defended on
the ground that race was a bona fide occuptional qualifiction (BFOQ) for driving a truck in South Boston. The sole
issue presented to the Court on appeal:

Under what circumstances can an employer deny employment opportunities
based on race because of anticipated
racial violence? The employer argued
that, under ,these circumstances, race
was a BFOQ for driving in South Boston
and that this should serve as a complete
defense to a charge of race discrimination. 1
Without deciding whether coercion
from third parties could ever legitimize
a BFOQ, the Court found that Sarni had
not proved race was a BFOQ for this
particular job. In dicta, the SJC cited the
MCAD's conclusion that "to allow such
flagrant criminality [rock throwing and
violence] to serve as the justification for
a racial termination ... would reward
and encourage the very lawlessness and
racism which it is the purpose of Chapter 151B to eliminate." 1,Thus, although
the precise role of third party coercion
was still unclear in Massachusetts, the
Sarni Court strongly suggested that
third party coercion was no defense to
a charge of discrimination.
B. Federal Civil Rights Law
Sarni'spolicy is consistent with long established federal law. As early as 1917,
the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated a
Kentucky statute that forbade blacks
from buying homes in a white neighborhood in order to protect the public
peace. In Buchanan v. Warley, the
State of Kentucky argued that this ordinance was a legitimate exercise of the
police power because it diminished miscegenation, promoted public peace by
averting racial tension, and prevented
the deterioration in the value of homes
owned by whites. The Court rejected
these arguments, focusing in particular
on the state's purported concern with
maintaining public peace:
That there exists a serious and
difficult problem arising from a
feeling of race hostility which the
law is powerless to control, and to
which it must give a measure of
consideration, may be freely admitted. But its solution cannot be
promoted by depriving citizens of
their constitutional rights and
privileges."
Thereafter, particularly in the context
of desegregation, the U.S. Supreme
Court has repeatedly refused to accept
a threat of violence - real or perceived

-

to justify even a temporary de-

privation of rights. For example, in
Cooper v. AaronI 5 the Court refused to
uphold a suspension of the desegregation plan for the Little Rock, Arkansas,
schools in the face of "chaos, bedlam
and turmoil," and "repeated incidents of
more or less serious violence directed
against the Negro students and their
property." 16 The Court recognized that
to allow lawlessness to succeed in halting desegregation would have the intended effect of "depriving the Negro
children of their constitutional

ficials in the seizure of disputed
property is sufficient to characterize
that party as a 'state actor' for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment. 2"
II. Conflicting Assertions of
Constitutional Rights

Perhaps the most curious portion of the
Redgrave opinion is a short preamble to
the main discussion wherein the Chief
Justice strongly suggests that, were the
whole case before the Court, the certified questions might have been anrights." 17 The Court, foreshadowing
swered very differently. The opinion
the role of the SJC in R'dgrave, noted
hints that there are "some eci lous issues
that "the responsibility of those who exwhich are not addressed in the [certified]
ercise power in a democratic governquestions but which are suggested by the
ment is not to reflect inflamed public record of the case," 2) and further sugfeeling but to help form its understandgests that the BSO's conflicting right not
ing." 18 Other federal courts have simito perform may be "a complete defense
larly rejected third party coercion claims
to the action." 24 However, the opinin the employment, free speech, housion explicitly disavows any "consider1
ing, and desegregation contexts. ' Of
[ation]" of these "issues in answering the
course, as each of these cases involved
two certified questions." 25
state action, there was no question
In an amicus brief filed with the SJC
raised as to the liability of private by the American Jewish Congress (AJC),
persons.
the AJC sought to support the BSO by
What makes Redgrave in many ways
reference to the free speech rights of the
a more difficult case than Sarni or the
subscribers and the general public, i.e.,
many federal civil rights opinions in this
their right to express their disagreement
area, is the fact that the Massachusetts
with Miss Redgrave's support for the
Civil Rights Act is the state counterpart Palestine Liberation Organization." AJC
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 but without any re- Brief, p. xiii. The AJC Brief further
quirement of state action. See Batchelder
argued that "[ain individual's volitional
v. Allied Store Corporation.20 This is an
exercise of free speech by expression of
important distinction because the effect
controversial ideas naturally draws its
of the new statute is to constitutionalize
opponents, whose responsive exercise of
what would otherwise be private causes free speech ought equally to be proof action sounding in tort or breach of
tected in a free society." AJC Brief, p.1.
contract.
Whatever superficial charm this reasonHowever, even this is not without
ing holds, the SJC properly noted that
precedent. In Lugar v. Edmonson Oil
the BSO was largely motivated to cancel
Co., Inc.,2 1 the Supreme Court found
its performance by a fear of serious viothat a private citizen who used state
lence and not by a desire to add its voice
court procedures in order to obtain a
to the cacophony of debate over the
prejudgment attachment of certain P.L.O. Thus the only protected speech
property was a "state actor" where the
at stake was Miss Redgrave's and, posstatutory scheme was alleged to be prosibly, that of the BSO as an artistic
cedurally defective under the Due Proenterprise. The public's protected access Clause. The Court noted:
tivities were limited to public (or
While private misuse of a state
private) condemnation of the BSO
2
statute does not describe conduct
and/or Miss Redgrave.
that can be attributed to the State,
Indeed, the anger of the general pubthe procedural scheme created by
lic in Redgrave is not unlike the anthe statute obviously is the product
ticipated community hostility recently
of state action ....
[Wie have conaddressed in Sarni OriginalDry Cleansistently held that a private party's
ers, Inc. v. Cooke27 or in Palmore v.
joint participation with state of-

Sidoti.' s In Palmore the U.S. Supreme thereby ensuring that inflamed passions
Court reversed a Florida state court will not be further stoked by third pardecision that permitted consideration by ties - a result entirely consistent with
the state of the "pressures and stresses" pre-existing federal law regarding third
35
that would bear upon a child living in party coercion.
a racially mixed household.9 The
A clear salutory effect of the SJC's
Florida state court, after considering the decision to penalize employers (and
social consequences of interracial mar- others) who succumb to unlawful public
riage, had transferred custody of the "pressure" will be to expand the pool of
child from the mother to the father parties whose interests (pecuniary and
because the mother had married a black otherwise) are served by avoiding vioman, and this union was considered "a lence. Forcing the BSO to pay Miss Redlife-style unacceptable to the father and grave civil rights damages (or, in the
to society." 10 The Supreme Court future, to preserve her contract) means
acknowledged that the "pressures and that both Miss Redgrave and the BSO
stresses" the state court anticipated were share a stake in encouraging the comreal:
munity to Form an understanding of individual rights.1b As many courts have
It would ignore reality to suggest
held in a variety of contexts, public
that racial and ethnic prejudices do
anger should not support a denial of
not exist or that all manifestations
constitutional rights.
of those prejudices have been
eliminated."
NOTES
Nonetheless, the Court concluded that:
1. The Massachusetts Civil Rights Act,
The Constitution cannot control
M.G.L.A. c. 12, §§11 H and 111.
such prejudices but neither can it
Section 11 H provides: "Whenever any person or
persons, whether or not acting under color of law,
tolerate them. Private biases may
Interfere by threats, Intimidation or coercion, or
be outside the reach of the law, but
attempt to Interfere by threats, intimidation or
the law cannot, directly or indicoercion, with the exercise or enjoyment by any
32
other person or persons of rights secured by the
rectly, give them effect.
or laws of the United States, or of
In short, the Court refused to allow con- constitution
rights secured by the constitution or laws of the
cerns about public disapproval to affect commonwealth, the attorney general may bring
the rights of the individuals who were a civil action for injunctive or other appropriate
equitable relief in order to protect the peaceable
the (potential) objects of scorn and exercise or enjoyment of the right or rights secured.
Said civil action shall be brought in the name of
derision.
the commonwealth and shall be instituted either
Similarly in Redgrave, the BSO the superior court fur the county in which the
like the father in Palmore and the In
conduct complained of occurred or in the superior
employer in Sarni - sought approval court for the counti' in which the person whose
for actions that unquestionably in- conduct complained of resides or has his principal
place of business."
fringed upon the protected interests of
Section 11 I provides: "Any person
exerindividuals by claiming that the infringe- cise or enjoyment of rights secured by whose
the constitument was necessary to avoid societal tion or laws of the United States, or of rights
condemnation. Both the BSO and Sarni secured by the constitution or laws of the commonwealth, has been Interfered with, or attempted
Dry Cleaners concluded that the path of to be interfered with, as described in section
least resistance in the face of threatened 11 H, may Institute and prosecute in his own name
violence was to surrender to "inflamed and on his own behalf a civil action for Injuncand other appropriate equitable relief as propublic feeling." For Miss Redgrave, this tive
vided for in said section, including the award of
meant allowing lawful (and unlawful) compensatory money damages. Any aggrieved
"speech" to silence her own clearly pro- person or persons who prevail in an action
authorized by this section shall be entitled to an
tected views. 3 The BSO, like Sarni Dry award of the costs of the litigation and reasonable
Cleaners, sought to extricate itself from attorneys' fees in an amount to be fixed by the
an unanticipated, unpleasant situation court."
2. 42 U.S.C. §1983 states: Every person who,
at Miss Redgrave's expense, despite the under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
fact that no one maintained that the custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the
alternative of summoning the authorities District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
ii the event of violence was unavail- person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deable.3" The SJC's decision indicates that privation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
this type of "self-help," regardless of in- secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party Injured in an action at law, suit
tent, is actionable under MCRA, in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.

For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a Statute of the
District of Columbia.
3. Miss Redgrave and Vanessa Redgrave Enterprises Ltd. sued the BSO in federal district court
for breach of contract and violation of her civil
rights after the BSO canceled five scheduled performances of Stravinsky's Oedipus R.,x In which
Miss Redgrave was to appear as the narrator. At
trial, the BSO admitted to canceling her contract,
but maintained that It did so "because it was felt
that potential disruptions, which BSO agents perceived as quite possible given the community reaction, would implicate the physical safety of the
audience and players and would jeopardize the artistic integrity of the production." 399 Mass. at 95.
The jury found expressly that the BSO did not intend to interfere with Miss Redgrave's political
stance.
4. 399 Mass. at 93.
5. Id.
6. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
7. Although not dealt with in the opinion, the
substantive constitutional rights in question were
Miss Redgrave's right to express freely her political
views and her right of association, rights unquestionably protected by the First Amendment. Redgrave argued that canceling her appearance was
an impermissible attempt to "chill" her exercise of
these rights.
8. 399 Mass. at 100.
9. 388 Mass. 611 (1983).
10. In another recent opinion, the Court also
held that an individual may recover for tortious
interference with his employment. Tosti v. Ayik,
400 Mass. 224 (1987) (Plaintiff, a foreman at General Motors, was terminated after the union newspaper falsely accused him of falsifying work
records).
11. The claimant In Sarni proceeded under the
Massachusetts anti-discrimination statute,
M.G.L.c. 151B §4, which prohibits, inter alia,
discrimination in employment on the basis of race.
The SJC concluded: "A BFOQ is an affirmative
defense. The burden of proving the defense is on
the employer. The standard is an objective one,
and the subjective opinions of the employer, however sincere, are Irrelevant if not shown, objectively, to be reasonable. In order to invoke the
BFOQ successfully, the employer must show that
it has 'a factual basis for believing that all or
substantially all [members of the excluded category) would be unable to perform safely and efficiently the duties of the job involved.' "388 Mass.
at 617-618, (cites omitted).
12. 388 Mass. at 618, n.7.
13. 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
14. 245 U.S. at 80-81.
15. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
16. Id.at 13.
17. Id. at 16.
18. Id. at 26 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Of
course, Justice Frankfurter was speaking of the
state and not about a private party such as the
BSO.
19. Employment: Diaz v. Pan American World
Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.) cert. denied,
404 U.S. 950 (1971) (despite overwhelming preference of the public for female flight attendants, the
public's prejudices will not sustain a claim by an
airline that sex is a bona fide occupational qualification for the flight attendant position). Speech:
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community
School District, 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969) ("in our
system, undifferentiated fear or apprehension of
disturbance is not enough to overcome the right
to freedom of expression"). Housing: Resident

Advisory Board v. Rizzo, 425 F. Supp. 987 (E.D.
Pa. 1976) (threat of violence from neighbors will
not justify city's decision to stop construction of
public housing). Desegregation: Wright v. Georgia, 373 U.S. 284, 293 (1963) ("the possibility of
disorder by others cannot justify exclusion of persons from a place it they otherwise have a constitutional right . . .to be present )- Cooper v.

Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 16 (1958) ("cortitutional rights
. * .are not to be sacrificed or yielded to the
violence and disorder which have followed upon
the assertion of those rights."
20. 393 Mass. 819, 822-823 (1985) ("The Legislature enacted G.L. c. 12, §§ 11H and 111, to provide a State remedy for deprivations of civil rights.
The statute extended beyond the limits of its Federal counterpart by incorporating private action
within its bounds. We conclude that the Legislature intended to provide a remedy under G.L. c.
12, §111, coextensive with 42 U.S.C. §1983, (Supp.
V 1981), except that the Federal statute requires
State action whereas its State counterpart does
not.")
21. 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
22. Id. at 941. In a footnote undoubtedly
designed to narrow the prospective effect of its
holding, the Lugar Court suggested that the problem of holding "private individuals who innocently
make use of seemingly valid state laws... responsible, if the law is subsequently held to be unconstitutional" be dealt with by "establishing an affirmative defense." Id at 942 n.23. No such immunity exists under the MCRA.
23. 399 Mass. at 97.
24. Id.
25. Id. There can be no question but that the
BSO is entitled to make decisions about the performances it will give and those it will not. See
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, Article 16.
Justices Wilkins and Abrams, concurring, noted
that "Redgrave's constitutional rights are no greater
than those of the BSO, and there was no way in
which the interests of each could be accommodated." 399 Mass. at 102. Following the lead of
the SJC's observation, the BSO later argued to the
First Circuit that it had a First Amendment right
to protect the integrity of its artistic production
which excused the cancellation of its performance.
821 F.2d 339 (WITHDRAWN). Although initially
rejected, this argument has successfully been raised
by the BSO and several amici as the basis for a
rehearing en banc by the First Circuit.
26. As for the BSO's "artistic integrity" argument, it Is hard to see how the BSO's admitted
right to choose whether and how to "speak" artistically has been interfered with. The BSO, without
any coercion from the state or third parties, undertook to engage Miss Redgrave. This artistic decision was entirely volitional.
27. 388 Mass. 611 (1983).
28. 466 U.S. 429 (1984).
29. Id. at 433.
30. Id. at 431.
31. Id.at 433.
32. Id.
33. No one has seriously suggested that canceling her employment contract w'-uld not "chill"
Redgrave's right to speak in ie ,;'ture. Indeed,
Miss Redgrave argued that the BSO', actions put
to her the choice of changing her speech or suffering the attendant loss of future employment due
to her controversial views. Redgrave v. B.S.O.,
831 F.2d 339 (1987) (WITHDRAWN).
34. See. e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15
(1971); Terminiello v.Chicago, 337U.S. 1 (1949);
and Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (1973) wherein
the U.S. Supreme Court has refused to regulate
speech that did not contain "fighting words" or

a "clear and present danger" to peace. In general,
a "speaker cannot . silenced if his or her identity is the primary factor offered to justify the conclusion that audience violence is imminent." L.
Tribe, American Constitutional Law 854 (2d ed.
§12-10 1988).
35. Nonetheless, the wavering language in Redgrave that raises the possibility of the BSO's constitutional right of artistic integrity has resulted in
a lingering uncertainty over the role of third party
coercion between private parties. Had the Court

adopted what appears to be the clear "federal rule"
on third party coercion, the result would have been
a more forceful rejection of the BSO's arguments
and those of employers generally who seek to
avoid "inflamed public feeling" at all cost.
36. Indeed, that is the view taken by the majority in the First Circuit opinion. See Redgrave
v. BSO, Inc., 831 F.2d 339 (1987) (rejecting the
BSO's artistic integrity defense). However, the First
Circuit reheard this matter en bonc on April 6,
1988.
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